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Is it ethical to pay patients for selecting cheaper medical treatments?  The healthcare system in the United States is notoriously profligate, at least in part because when insurers foot the bill, patients have little incentive to avoid wasteful treatments.  One familiar means for dealing with this problem is for insurers to offer reduced co-pays to patients who select cheaper treatments.  Would it be ethical to take this one step further, beyond the zero bound, sharing the savings of cheaper treatments by positively paying the patients who select them? Schmidt & Emanuel recently proposed this policy of ‘Inclusive Shared Savings’ (ISS).​[1]​  This paper examines various ethical objections to the idea.

I first argue that there are a range of cases—namely, those in which the more expensive treatments offer no significant medical benefit—for which ISS should be recognized as clearly ethical.  Next I consider the more difficult cases where real tradeoffs must be made.  It sounds much more morally problematic to pay a patient to “settle” for a less effective treatment.  But I argue that, in at least some cases, a second-best treatment may qualify as good enough rather than inadequate, such that it may be both (i) reasonable for the patient to prefer to share in the savings than to splurge on the medically “optimal” treatment, and (ii) ethical for healthcare institutions to make this offer to the patient.

1. The “Zero Doesn't Matter” Argument

A very simple argument for the permissibility of ISS is suggested by observing that the idea is equivalent to that of “negative co-payments”​[2]​:

(P1) It’s (often) permissible to offer reduced co-pays to patients who select more cost-effective treatments.
(P2) Zero Doesn't Matter: There’s nothing particularly morally significant about the zero bound. If it’s permissible to reduce co-pays from $100 to $0 in a given circumstance, it would be similarly permissible to “reduce” them from zero to a “negative co-pay” (or reward) of $100, in otherwise similar circumstances.
(C) So, it’s (often) permissible to offer financial rewards to patients who select more cost-effective treatments.





Perhaps the most serious objection to this argument grants that “zero doesn't matter” intrinsically, but goes on to note that—as a contingent matter of fact—offers of payment may have greater psychological impact than would merely reducing one's co-pay,​[3]​ and that this difference may be morally significant. This is especially relevant if we are concerned about undue inducement, or the idea that the incentive might be so enticing to some patients that they end up opting for it against their better interests.

This objection is importantly limited in scope.  First, it’s clearly inapplicable in cases where the incentivized treatment is therapeutically equivalent to its more expensive alternatives.  A patient has no genuine interest in opting for gratuitously wasteful treatment options, so encouraging the more cost-effective treatment cannot be contrary to her best interests.  In these simple cases, ISS offers benefits at no real risk.

Second, even in cases where the incentive is being given to take a slightly less effective medical treatment, we should not rush to the paternalistic judgment that the offer is thereby bad overall for the patient.  If the patient judges that the cheaper treatment is adequate for their needs, and that they would rather have the extra money (perhaps allowing them to pay off their debts, expand a child’s educational opportunities, or take a long-awaited vacation) than to instead receive the medically optimal treatment, then this is surely prima facie evidence that the former is indeed what is most in their interests.  Granted, they could be wrong about this, but we would need some special reason for thinking so.  The mere possibility is not enough.  For this objection to get off the ground, we would need reasons to think that the risk of patient harm here outweighs the likelihood of patient benefit.  Such concerns may be further mitigated by evidence suggesting that payment actually leads patients to examine risks more carefully.​[4]​

If concerns remain about undue inducement, ISS might be restricted along either of two dimensions.  We could place a cap on the maximum payment size, thereby reducing its power to entice.  Or we could restrict which options get incentivized in the first place, only approving ISS for cheaper treatments that are also approved by a panel of medical experts as “good enough” rather than “inadequate”, compared to the optimal treatment.

Either of these restrictions would inherit (to a lesser degree) some of the downsides of the status quo: restricting patients’ autonomy to make their own tradeoffs between medical and non-medical values, limiting the benefits available to the patients (insofar as they could have been expected to use their extra autonomy prudently), and limiting the cost-effectiveness gains to the system (insofar as the incentives for cost-effective choice are sometimes either weakened or withdrawn altogether).  A more restricted system of ISS might thus be less than optimal.  But it would still be a significant improvement over the status quo, and one that could safely be instituted without risk of undue inducement.

3. “Good enough” vs. Inadequate Treatment

Suppose we decide that ISS is best restricted to a range of acceptable treatments, with no incentive at all offered for cheap treatments that are judged “inadequate”.  On what basis should these classifications be made?  How are we to draw the line between those less-effective treatments that are nonetheless “good enough”, from those that are so much worse as to be considered wholly unacceptable?  Are there grounds for drawing a principled distinction here?

One thing to note is that the classifications cannot be determined by the purely intrinsic features of a treatment.  Whether a treatment is inadequate depends on what the alternatives are.  Here it seems we should be interested in both the comparative effectiveness of rival treatments, and their comparative costs.  For example, we should not encourage use of a treatment that is much less effective than its rival, while being only very slightly cheaper.  So, at a minimum, we should require that the cheaper treatment be at least comparably cost-effective (perhaps assessed in terms of $ per QALY gained), and preferably more cost-effective than its rivals.

On the other hand, it clearly will not do to always blindly approve whatever happens to be the most cost-effective treatment.  To save five years of life for a penny is more cost-effective than saving fifty years of life for a dollar, but it would be foolish in the extreme to prefer the former to the latter on that basis alone.  As this example shows, if multiple options are highly cost-effective, it will often make sense to prefer the one that offers the greatest total benefit over the one that merely offers the greatest ratio of benefits to costs.

One way to institute this idea would be to assign an explicit ceiling to the “cost per QALY” that we consider cost-effective—$30 000, say—and then incentivize whatever treatments yield the greatest magnitudes of benefits for under this cost per QALY.  To illustrate, suppose we have three rival treatments.   Treatment A costs $50 000 per year for a 0.3 QALY annual improvement.  Treatment B costs $5 000 per year for a 0.2 QALY improvement. And treatment C costs $1000 per year for a 0.1 QALY improvement.  In this case, both treatments B and C qualify as adequately “cost-effective” (i.e., they fall below the “$30 000 per QALY” ceiling), and within this bracket, B offers the greatest medical benefit, and so—according to the above proposal—only treatment B should be incentivized by ISS.







Risking Quality vs. Quantity of Life









Worries are sometimes raised about the role that money plays in medical decisions.  In particular, the idea that patients might accept worse health outcomes for the sake of a monetary incentive could raise fears that this involves “commodifying” their own health, or valuing it in an inappropriately instrumental way.

There are two reasons why this cannot function as an objection to ISS.  Firstly, even if one took “commodification” worries seriously, the Zero Doesn't Matter argument shows that ISS is not significantly different from the status quo in this regard.  It does not “commodify” health any more than does the existing practice of reducing co-payments for patients who select more cost-effective treatments.

Secondly, and more fundamentally, there is no good reason to accept the premise of the commodification objection—that willingness to make tradeoffs entails merely instrumental valuation.​[5]​  When two or more final goods are in conflict, one must make tradeoffs between them—that's just what it is for the values to be in conflict: you cannot fully realize them all.  In light of this fact, the commodification objection amounts to the mere assertion that one ought to give lexical priority to medical values over whatever non-medical values one could realize with greater financial resources.  Given that different people will reasonably diverge in the weights they assign to their various medical and non-medical interests, it seems indefensible to impose a “one size fits all” policy of strictly prioritizing medical interests to the detriment of patients’ non-medical interests.  Again, it seems far more respectful to allow individual patients to decide for themselves on the appropriate tradeoffs between these conflicting values.

Isn’t this just propping up a failing system? 
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